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Abstract
We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems
with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a
success or a failure, and the rst success reveals the risky arm to dominate
the safe one. When payos are public information, the ensuing free-rider
problem is so severe that the equilibrium number of experiments is at most
one plus the number of experiments that a single agent would perform.
When payos are private information and players can communicate via
cheap talk, the socially optimal symmetric experimentation prole can be
supported as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for suciently optimistic prior
beliefs. These results generalize to more than two players whenever the
success probability per period is not too high. In particular, this is the
case when successes occur at the jump times of a Poisson process and the
period length is suciently small.
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1 Introduction
In many real-life situations, economic agents face a trade-o between exploring
new options and exploiting their knowledge about which option is likely to be
best. A stylized model capturing this feature is a two-armed bandit problem
in which a gambler repeatedly decides which of two dierent slot machines to
play with the ultimate goal of maximizing his monetary reward. In the simplest
version of this problem, one arm is safe, and the other risky. The expected
payo per round is known for the safe arm, whereas the consecutive payos of
the risky arm are independent draws from some unknown distribution. When
playing the risky arm, the agent learns more about this distribution|knowledge
that is useful for future choices. Starting with Rothschild (1974), variants of this
bandit problem have been studied in a wide variety of economic settings; see
Bergemann and Valimaki (2008) for an overview, and the references cited below
for specic applications.
Often, it is natural to presume that an agent can learn not only from her own
exploration but also from the experiences of others. Experimental consumption
is a case in point. As a stylized example, suppose there are two restaurant goers
with common tastes. They choose between two items on a given menu and both
know the quality of one regular item that has been on the menu for a long time.
The other item is new on the menu; its quality critically depends on how well it
is cooked. The restaurant's chef is believed to be either good or very good. A
very good chef is able to sometimes prepare the item nearly perfectly, while a
good chef is only able to prepare a dish of average quality. Each diner can now
learn through three channels: he may experiment himself and try the new item,
he may learn from observing what the other chooses, and nally he may ask the
other customer about whether the item was well-prepared whenever she tried it.
To formalize these ideas, we consider a game in which two players face identical
bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. The payo distribution of the
risky arm is the same for both players, and can be either \good" or \bad". In
each period, either type of arm produces a \success" or a \failure", with the
latter being more likely when the arm is bad. While we are mainly interested
in the problem of strategic experimentation with private payos, we begin by
analyzing a benchmark case in which players' actions and payos are publicly
observable, so that even absent any communication all players always share a
common belief about the state of the world. This scenario has been studied
extensively (Bolton and Harris 1999, 2000, Keller, Rady and Cripps 2005, Keller
and Rady 2010). Focusing on continuous-time setups, the literature shows that,
if the players condition their actions on their common belief only, i.e. if they
use Markov perfect strategies, it is impossible to achieve the social optimum.
Furthermore, if a single success on the risky arm fully reveals the good state of
the world, then in any Markov perfect equilibrium players stop experimenting
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once the common belief reaches the single-agent cut-o (Keller, Rady and Cripps
2005).
Maintaining the assumption of fully revealing successes, we introduce a discrete-
time setup and considerably strengthen these existing results by showing that in
any Nash equilibrium, players stop experimenting once the common belief falls
beneath the single-agent cut-o. Furthermore, we prove that the total number of
experiments performed in equilibrium diers from the single-agent optimum by
at most one.
We then turn to the main focus of this paper: strategic experimentation under
private information. Now, the players observe each other's behavior but not the
realized payos. Instead, we allow players to communicate via cheap talk.1 In
such a context, players have three sources of information: their own signals,
their observation of other players, and the cheap-talk messages. We begin by
noting that cheap talk in this environment is very eective. In particular, we
show that for every equilibrium with publicly observable payos, there exists an
equilibrium with privately observable payos that yields the same distribution
over experimentation paths, that is, sequences of experimentation choices and
results.
The key intuition lies in the fact that truthful communication is easy to sus-
tain. Following a success, a player is certain about the underlying state of the
world and is willing to truthfully communicate her success. Furthermore, if a
player believes that the other player is communicating truthfully, she believes
that the state of the world is good with probability 1 upon hearing that her
fellow player had a success. In this case, she is willing to play the risky arm for-
ever without communicating her future payos. But then no player will want to
wrongly announce a success because this will make it impossible to learn anything
from one's fellow player in the future. Truthful revelation of payos, therefore, is
always incentive compatible and any equilibrium outcome with observable payos
can be replicated when payos are only privately observable.
More surprisingly, we also prove that if the initial belief is suciently opti-
mistic, then the socially optimal symmetric strategy prole can be supported as a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.2 To see the logic behind the equilibrium construc-
tion, suppose that the optimal symmetric solution of the social planner requires
 > 1 periods of experimentation. Given an initial belief above the cut-o that
1It is very natural to let players communicate in a strategic environment in which there is
only an information externality between them. A similar approach has been taken in collusion
models with imperfect private monitoring|where communication however is illegal in contrast
to the current setting; see e.g. Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998). Athey and
Bagwell (2008) analyze collusive schemes in a framework with publicly observable pricing and
output decisions and cheap-talk announcements of private cost shocks.
2Focussing on the socially optimal symmetric prole entails only a minor eciency loss. In
fact, we show that in the \unrestricted" social optimum there is at most one period in which a
single player experiments.
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a myopic agent would apply, both players are willing to experiment in the rst
period. At a later stage, player i may be tempted to pause while her fellow player
j engages in costly experimentation. Following such a deviation to the safe arm
by player i, however, player j believes that i had a prior success and, hence, j is
willing to use the risky arm forever without communicating.3 This implies that
player i cannot learn anything from player j's subsequent actions, and thereby
deters free-riding.
While these beliefs are consistent in the sense of sequential equilibrium, one
may not nd them fully convincing. This leads us to consider an ad-hoc rene-
ment of pessimistic beliefs. Upon observing a deviation to the safe arm, pes-
simistic beliefs require a player|who is still uncertain as to whether the risky
arm is good|to believe that the other player's experiments all failed. We prove
that the socially optimal symmetric strategy prole can be supported as a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium with pessimistic beliefs if the players' initial belief is su-
ciently optimistic. To implement the socially optimal symmetric prole, we let
both players experiment for as many rounds  as the social planner would, and
thereafter communicate whether they have had a success. Intuitively, we exploit
the fact that a player observing only his own experiments learns at a slower rate
than a social planner who observes both players' experiments. As players learn
only from their own experiments prior to round  , therefore, they remain above
the myopic cut-o if initially they were suciently optimistic.
It is straightforward to embed our discrete-time model in a version of the
continuous-time framework of Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). The discrete-time
model then corresponds to imposing an equally-spaced grid of times at which
the players can choose actions and send messages. Taking the grid size to zero,
we show that in our construction of perfect Bayesian equilibria with punishment
via beliefs, the restriction to suciently optimistic prior beliefs can be dropped.
Given any prior, therefore, a suciently small period length will ensure that the
symmetric optimum can be achieved in an equilibrium with private payos and
cheap-talk communication, in marked contrast to the case of public payos.
The proofs of our main results extend to an arbitrary number of players when-
ever the probability of observing a success in any given period is not too high. In
particular, this is the case when we embed the model in continuous time as de-
scribed and consider suciently short periods. Proceeding this way also ensures
that the socially optimal symmetric strategy prole remains a good proxy for the
asymmetric prole that an unrestricted social planner would like to implement.
Besides the papers on strategic experimentation already mentioned, our work
is most closely related to Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2007). We follow these
authors in studying a discrete-time experimentation game with bandits whose
risky arm can be of two possible types, and with players who observe each other's
3This \punishment via beliefs" construction is similar in spirit to the one sustaining collusion
in Blume and Heidhues (2006).
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actions but not each other's payos. There are, however, two important dier-
ences: rst, Rosenberg et al. assume the decision to stop experimenting to be
irreversible, whereas we allow the players to freely switch from one arm to the
other and back; second, we permit communication between the players. With
irreversible stopping decisions, players cannot free-ride on an opponent's exper-
imentation eorts, so if we assumed irreversible decisions in our framework, the
socially optimal symmetric strategy prole could easily be supported as an equi-
librium with truthful communication.4 The ability to switch actions freely thus
enriches the players' strategic possibilities considerably, and makes it more di-
cult to achieve eciency.
There are a number of papers which introduce private information into a
model of learning where, as in our setting, one type of risky \project" generates
a perfectly informative signal at some random time while the other type never
does.5 Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005) study the nancing of a venture project
in a dynamic agency model where the allocation of funds and the learning process
are subject to moral hazard. Decamps and Mariotti (2004) analyze a duopoly
model of irreversible investment with a learning externality and privately ob-
served investment costs. Acemoglu, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar (2011) investigate
the eect of patents on rms' irreversible decisions to experiment themselves or
copy a successful rival; they allow for private information about a project's success
probability, but assume observable actions and outcomes.6 In a model with public
actions, private payos and irreversible stopping decisions, Murto and Valimaki
(2011) examine information aggregation through observational learning by a large
number of players. Allowing for reversible experimentation choices, Bonatti and
Horner (2011) study a game in which the players' actions are private information
and experimentation outcomes are public, which is precisely the opposite of what
we assume here. Like Rosenberg et al., these authors all preclude communication
between the players.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 solves the social planner's problem. Section 4 studies strategic experi-
mentation, rst with public payos, then with private payos. Section 5 embeds
4In fact, a player who is meant to experiment under this strategy prole faces the same
trade-o as the social planner: if she experiments, she bears the current cost of one experiment
but learns the result of two experiments, while if she refrains from experimenting she obtains the
outside payo. Crucially, the players have no incentive to misrepresent their experimentation
results when implementing this optimum: above the social planner's cut-o belief, both players
experiment anyhow and benet from each other's experimentation; below the cut-o, each
player wants to cease experimentation even if the other experiments, and therefore has no
incentive to misrepresent the fact that she is below the cut-o.
5With public information, this signal structure can be found in the models of R&D compe-
tition proposed by Malueg and Tsutsui (1997) and Besanko and Wu (2012).
6In their analysis of R&D races as preemption games with private information, Hopenhayn
and Squintani (2011) instead let players' private information states increase stochastically over
time according to a compound Poisson process.
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the model in a continuous-time framework. Section 6 explains how our results
generalize to more than two players. Section 7 concludes and discusses possible
extensions.
2 The Model
There is an innite number of periods t = 0; 1; : : : and there are two players
who in each period choose between a safe and a risky action (or \arm"). Before
making this choice, they can costlessly communicate with each other.
More precisely, at the beginning of period t, each player i chooses a cheap-
talk message mi(t) 2 [0; 1]. Upon having observed the other player's cheap-talk
message, each player i then chooses an action ki(t) 2 fR; Sg. If ki(t) = S, the
player receives a safe payo normalized to 0; if ki(t) = R, the player receives a
risky payo Xi(t) that is either low (XL) or high (XH), where XL < 0 < XH .
The distribution of the risky payo depends on an unknown state of the world,
which is either good ( = 1) or bad ( = 0). Conditional on the state of the world,
payos are drawn independently across players and periods. In the good state of
the world, the probability of the high payo is P(XH j = 1) =  > 0; in the bad
state, it is P(XH j = 0) = 0. Thus, a single draw of XH proves that the state
of the world is good. This makes our model a discrete-time analog of the model
analyzed in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). We write E for the conditional
expectation E[Xi(t)j] of the risky payo in any given period, and assume that
E0 < 0 < E1. We say that a player experiments if he chooses the risky action
while still being uncertain about the true state of the world.
Our primary interest below is in analyzing the game in which actions are
publicly observable but the realizations of the risky payos Xi(t) are private
information. When considering this game, we partition the set of private histories
for each player into those after which he has to send a message and those after
which he has to choose an action. Let
O = f(R;XL); (R;XH); (S; 0)g
be the set of possible combinations of a player's actions and payos that can
occur in any period. Then, the set of private message histories of player i at time
t is
Hmi;t =
0@ [0; 1]2| {z }
messages
 O|{z}
own action & payo
 fR;Sg| {z }
opponent's action
1At :
Similarly, the set of all private action histories of player i at time t is
Hai;t =
0@ [0; 1]2| {z }
messages
1At+1 
0@ O|{z}
own action & payo
 fR; Sg| {z }
opponent's action
1At :
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Finally, let Hmi =
S1
t=0H
m
i;t and H
a
i =
S1
t=0H
a
i;t.
A pure strategy is a mapping that assigns to each private message history
hmi 2 Hmi a message mi(hmi ) 2 [0; 1] and to each private action history hai 2 Hai
an action ki(h
a
i ) 2 fR; Sg. Mixed strategies are dened in the usual way.
Given a probability pi(0) = p that player i initially assigns to the good state
of the world, his expected payo from a pure-strategy prole is
(1  )Ep
" 1X
t=0
t1fki(hai (t))=RgXi(t)
#
;
where the factor 1  serves to express the overall payo in per-period units. Note
that player j's strategy only enters through the expectation operator|there is
just an informational externality at play here. We assume throughout that players
start with a common non-degenerate prior: p1(0) = p2(0) 2 ]0; 1[ .
As a benchmark, we will also study the game with observable payos. The
set of all public message histories at time t in this game is
Hmt =
0@ [0; 1]2| {z }
messages
 O O| {z }
actions & payos
1At ;
and the set of all public action histories at time t is
Hat =
0@ [0; 1]2| {z }
messages
1At+1 
0@ O O| {z }
actions & payos
1At :
With Hm =
S1
t=0H
m
t and H
a =
S1
t=0H
a
t , a pure strategy of player i is now
a mapping that assigns to each public message history hm 2 Hm a message
mi(h
m) 2 [0; 1] and to each public action history ha 2 Ha an action ki(ha) 2
fR;Sg.7
Unless stated explicitly otherwise, our solution concept is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Thus, a strategy prole is an equilibrium if there exists a belief
system such that each player acts optimally after every history given her beliefs
and the other player's strategy, and each player's beliefs are updated according to
Bayes' rule whenever possible. Furthermore, we naturally require player i's beliefs
about the state of the world to be independent of player j's actions and messages
whenever every signal that player j observed, was observed by player i as well. In
other words, we do not allow beliefs to change in response to observations which
cannot contain new information.
7While communication obviously has no role in transmitting experimentation results when
payos are observable, players could still use their messages to coordinate their continuation
play.
6
Whether payos are public information or not, we call
Het = (O O)t
the set of all possible experimentation paths at time t, and we let He =
S1
t=0H
e
t .
Using the canonical projections Ha1;t  Ha2;t ! Het and Hat ! Het , we associate
an experimentation path with each pair of private action histories and with each
public action history, respectively. We call two strategy proles path-equivalent
if they induce the same distribution over the set of all experimentation paths,
He. Note that all path-equivalent strategy proles give rise to the same payo
prole. What is more, this equivalence relation also applies in situations where
one strategy prole is from the game with private payos, and the other from the
game with public payos.
For future reference, we dene
pm =
jE0j
jE0j+ E1 :
This is the belief at which the expected current payo from the risky option just
equals zero, i.e. the safe payo. A myopic player chooses the risky arm if and
only if his posterior belief exceeds pm. We therefore call pm the myopic cut-o
belief.
Given any probability p 2 [0; 1] assigned to the good state of the world, the
updated probability after n failed experiments is
B(n; p) =
p(1  )n
p(1  )n + 1  p :
In the planner's problem as well as in the game with public payos, we denote
by p(t) the public belief induced by the history up to time t; that is, p(t) = 1 if
there was a success prior to period t, and p(t) = B(n; p(0)) if there were n failed
experiments prior to period t.
3 The Planner's Problem
In this section, we discuss the problem of a social planner who chooses a strategy
prole to maximize the average of the two players' objective functions. The
optimum in this situation will serve as a benchmark for the case that individual
players pursue their goals independently.
Let k = (k1; k2) denote a pure strategy prole in the scenario with private
payos. Then the players' expected average payo, expressed in per-period units,
is
u(p; k) = (1  )Ep
"
1
2
2X
i=1
1X
t=0
t1fki(hai (t))=RgXi(t)
#
;
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where p denotes the probability that the planner initially assigns to the good
state.
For the social planner, it can never be strictly benecial to have players hide
information from each other because she can always choose a strategy prole that
ignores unwanted information. Hence, when discussing the planner's problem, we
will focus on strategy proles in which all players truthfully communicate their
past payos via their cheap-talk messages. The planner's problem then becomes a
Markovian decision problem with the posterior belief as the single state variable.
A single success in the past fully reveals that the state of the world is good. It
is then a dominant choice for the planner to have both players take the risky action
in all following periods. Using this fact and restricting attention to symmetric
strategy proles, we can think of the planner as choosing a natural number   0
such that both players experiment in periods t     1 and, in case all these
experiments were unsuccessful, no player experiments in periods t   . For any
such  , expected average payos are
u(p; ) = (1  )
(
(1  p)
 1X
t=0
tE0 + p
 1X
t=0
tE1 + p[1  (1  )2 ]
1X
t=
tE1
)
= (1   )Ep + p[1  (1  )2 ]E1
with Ep = pE1 + (1  p)E0. Since the dierence
u(p;  + 1)  u(p; ) =  (   1)(1  p)jE0j   (1  )2pE1((1  )2   1))	
is positive if and only if
 <
1
2 ln(1  )

ln
   1
(1  )2   1 + ln
1  p
p
+ ln
jE0j
E1

;
the value function of the social planner is vsc(p) = u(p;  sc(p)) with8
 sc(p) = max

1
2 ln(1  )

ln
   1
(1  )2   1 + ln
1  p
p
+ ln
jE0j
E1

; 0

:
As  sc(p) = 0 if and only if p lies below the cut-o
psc =
(1  )jE0j
(1  )(E1 + jE0j) + (2  )E1 ;
we have the following result.
Proposition 1 (Optimal symmetric pure-strategy prole). Among all pure
symmetric strategy proles, the following maximizes the players' expected average
payo: both players always communicate their payos truthfully, both choose the
risky arm when p(t)  psc, and both choose the safe arm otherwise.
8The superscript \sc" indicates the \symmetric cooperative" solution. For any real number
x, the ceiling dxe is the smallest integer not less than x.
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If the social planner can use asymmetric strategy proles, it is optimal for
her to experiment beyond the belief psc. In fact, the expected discounted payo
from letting one player experiment and stopping all experimentation thereafter,
(1  )1
2
Ep + pE1; is positive above the cut-o
pc =
(1  )jE0j
(1  )(E1 + jE0j) + 2E1 < p
sc:
For the full description of the social optimum, we will also need the following
cut-o:
~pc =
(1  )jE0j
(1  )(E1 + jE0j) + 2(1  )E1 :
It is straightforward to see that ~pc > psc and that starting at ~pc, one failed
experiment takes the posterior belief below pc.
Proposition 2 (Optimal strategy prole). There exists a socially optimal
strategy prole in which both players always communicate their payos truthfully,
both choose the risky arm when p(t)  ~pc, one player chooses the risky arm when
~pc > p(t)  pc, and both choose the safe arm otherwise. Furthermore, there is at
most one period in which just one player experiments.
Proof. See Appendix.
Restricting the planner to symmetric pure-strategy proles thus entails only
a small loss in expected average payos.
4 Strategic Experimentation
We now turn to the analysis of strategic experimentation, rst with public payos,
then with private payos. While the planner's solution identied in the previous
section constitutes an upper bound on the average of the two players' equilibrium
payos, the solution to the single-agent bandit problem constitutes a lower bound
on each player's individual equilibrium payo. In fact, each player always has the
option to ignore the information contained in the opponent's actions and payos
(if the latter are observable).
A simpler version of the arguments leading up to Proposition 1 establishes
that the single-agent (or \autarky") solution is given by the cut-o belief
pa =
(1  )jE0j
(1  )(E1 + jE0j) + E1 > p
sc ;
where|as in the planner's solution|we adopt the convention that the agent ex-
periments when she is indierent, that is, when her belief equals pa. We shall
show that with publicly observable payos, equilibrium experimentation cannot
go beyond this cut-o. With privately observed payos and cheap-talk commu-
nication, by contrast, more ecient equilibria can be played.
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4.1 Public Payos
As both players choose the risky arm after any history h(t) 2 Hat in which a
success has been observed, we can restrict our attention to histories with no prior
success. We begin our analysis of equilibrium behavior with the observation that
in every Nash equilibrium of the game with public payos, both players choose
the safe arm after any history that takes their common belief below the social
planner's cut-o pc. To see this, suppose to the contrary that there exists a
Nash equilibrium in which a player experiments at some belief p < pc. From
the analysis of the planner's solution, we know that the average of the players'
objective functions at p is negative. Consequently there needs to be at least one
player who receives a negative expected payo. By deviating and always choosing
the safe arm this player can increase her payos.
To get a rst intuition for why equilibrium experimentation cannot go beyond
the single-agent cut-o, consider pure-strategy Nash equilibria rst. Since players
do not experiment below pc, there are only nitely many periods in which a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium can require players to experiment in the absence of a
prior success. In the last period in which a player is meant to experiment, the
player knows that if she fails, no player will experiment in future. Hence, she
will only be willing to experiment if this is individually optimal, that is, if the
current belief is at least pa. When both players are meant to experiment, the
belief must be above pa because the value of experimenting in this last period is
lower if one's fellow player also experiments. Hence, in any pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium there can be at most one more experiment than in the single-agent
solution.
Conversely, it cannot be the case that both players permanently stop exper-
imenting at a belief above the single-agent cut-o. The reason is simply that
each player|believing that the other player stopped experimenting|would then
face the single-agent trade-o. The following proposition exploits this logic and
extends it to mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
We call the number of times a player chooses the risky arm on the path of play
when every experiment is unsuccessful the amount of experimentation performed
by that player. The total amount of experimentation by both players is simply
the sum of the individual amounts. The total amount will typically depend on
the initial belief and, with mixed strategies, may be a random variable.
Proposition 3. Given an initial belief, let the optimal amount of experimentation
in the single-agent problem be K. In any Nash equilibrium of the experimentation
game with public payos, the realized total amount of experimentation is K   1,
K or K + 1.
Proof. First, consider any history of length t for which pa < p(t) < 1. Since
p(t) < 1, no prior experiment has been successful, and since p(t) > pa, fewer than
K experiments have been performed. We now argue that players experiment with
10
probability 1 at least one more time following any such history. Let va(p(t)) > 0
be the value of the single-agent problem at the belief p(t). Let  be the smallest
integer such that E1 < v
a(p(t)), and  the probability that there will be at least
one experiment in the periods t; t   1; : : : ; t +    1. The period t continuation
value of each player is then trivially bounded above by (1    )E1 +  E1. So
 cannot be smaller than  = [va(p(t))   E1]=[(1    )E1], because otherwise
it would be protable for each player to deviate to the single-agent solution. For
n = 1; 2; : : :, the probability that no player experiments in the next n periods is
bounded above by (1   )n. Letting n!1, we see that there will almost surely
be another experiment on the path of play.
Next, consider a history of length t for which p(t) = p < pa. Let  be
the probability with which player j experiments at time t. Suppose that the
equilibrium requires player i to experiment with positive probability. Then he
can do no better by switching to the strategy of playing safe now and, in case
player j experiments and is unsuccessful, continuing to play safe forever. This
implies
pE1  (1  )Ep + 

p[ +    2]E1 +
 
1  p[ +    2] v	 ;
where  +    2 is the probability of at least one success, and v player i's
continuation value after a double failure, that is, a payo realization X1(t) =
X2(t) = XL. As 0  v  E1, this in turn requires that
0  (1  )Ep + 

pE1 + (1  p)v
	
:
As p < pa, we have (1 )Ep+pE1 < 0, and hence v > 0. So some player must
experiment with positive probability in round t+ 1 or later. Repeating this step
until a time t+  at which p(t+ ) < pc in the absence of a success, we obtain a
contradiction because no player can experiment below pc in equilibrium.
Finally, consider a history of length t for which p(t) = pa, meaning that
pa = B(K   1; p(0)). Then, there can be no, one, or two further experiments on
the path of play, which completes the proof.
Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) establish in a continuous-time setup that
with fully revealing successes on the risky arm, the amount of experimentation
in any Markov perfect equilibrium is limited by the single-agent amount. In our
discrete-time setup, we can drop the assumption of Markov strategies and, with
a minor qualication due to discrete rather than continuous time, establish that
their nding extends to all Nash equilibria of the game with public payos.9
From now on, whenever we speak of an equilibrium, we mean a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium that satises the restriction on beliefs set out in Section
2. Since such equilibria are also Nash equilibria, Proposition 3 immediately im-
plies
9Note that a realized amount of experimentation equal to K   1 is non-generic because it
requires the initial belief to lie in a countable subset of the unit interval.
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Corollary 1. Whenever the total amount of experimentation in the planner's
optimal (or optimal symmetric) strategy prole exceeds the single-agent amount
by more than 1, it cannot be implemented in an equilibrium of the experimentation
game with observable payos.
Above, we have fully characterized the equilibria with public payos in terms
of the total amount of experimentation that is carried out on the path of play.
These, equilibria, however, may dier in other dimensions such as when players
experiment. For example, just above pa players may engage in a war of attrition
as to who has to carry out the nal experiment. Thus, there may be periods in
which no player experiments. Furthermore, players may use their communication
to coordinate on whether a given player is meant to experiment in a given period.
Below, we nevertheless show that for every equilibrium with observable payos
we can nd a path-equivalent equilibrium in the game with unobservable payos,
that is, an equilibrium which induces the same distribution over experimenta-
tion paths. Moreover, we show that under certain conditions, higher amounts of
experimentation can be supported when payos are unobservable.
For future reference, it is useful to establish the existence of a symmetric
Markov perfect equilibrium for the game with observable payos. Since in all
equilibria the total amount of experimentation is bounded by K + 1, we can
restrict attention to nitely many beliefs when constructing equilibria. Using
these nitely many beliefs as states (and thinking of the lowest belief as an ab-
sorbing state), it follows that there exist only nitely many pure Markov perfect
strategies. We construct an auxiliary game in which players' nite action set cor-
responds to the set of pure Markov perfect strategies and payos are dened as
in the original game. This is a symmetric nite game and the existence of a sym-
metric (possibly mixed-strategy) equilibrium in this auxiliary game follows from
Nash (1951). The equilibrium in the auxiliary game corresponds to a symmetric
Markov perfect equilibrium in the original game.
Below, we use the following bound on the payos of any symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium of the game with observable payos to construct punishment
equilibria in the game with unobservable payos.
Lemma 1. When payos are observable, the players' expected total payo in any
symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is lower than the payo from any strategy
prole which has both players experiment with probability 1 if and only if p(t)  pa.
Proof. See Appendix.
To see why this holds, x a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. It follows
from Proposition 3 that both players experiment with strictly positive probability
at all beliefs above pa. Since player i at least weakly prefers to experiment, his
payo remains unchanged if we modify the strategy prole so that he experiments
with probability 1 at all beliefs above pa. The crucial step is to show that if we,
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in addition, change the strategy prole so that player j also experiments for sure
at all these beliefs, player i's payo weakly increases. This is obvious in the nal
period as player i now benets from the greater information externality. The
proof uses backward induction to establish this result in earlier periods as well.
4.2 Private Payos
We begin by noting that truthful communication can be sustained with privately
observed, fully revealing payos. Suppose that after every period in which a player
experimented, she announces a rst success by sending the messagemi(t) = 1 and
randomizes uniformly over all other messages otherwise. Furthermore, after the
rst success has been announced and both players know that the state of the world
is good, suppose there are no meaningful messages any more, that is, both players
always \babble" by randomizing uniformly over the interval [0; 1]. Similarly, a
player who did not experiment randomizes uniformly over [0; 1]. Finally, on and
o the equilibrium path, players believe that past communication by the other
player was truthful. Intuitively, we are then back in the case of public payos.10
The key observation now is that if players anticipate this communication strat-
egy, truthful communication is incentive compatible. Following a rst success on
player i's risky arm, player i knows the state of the world and hence is indierent
as to what player j believes. So truthfully announcing a success is optimal for
player i following a success of his own. After such an announcement, player j
believes with certainty that the state of world is good, and hence will play risky
in all future periods irrespectively of what player i does after the announcement.
If player i incorrectly announces a success, he cannot infer anything from player
j's future behavior, so he is at last weakly better o telling the truth. We thus
have the following result.
Proposition 4. For every equilibrium of the game with public payos, there exists
a path-equivalent equilibrium of the game with private payos.
This shows that private information does not hurt players. Our next result es-
tablishes that players can often do better when payos are private. We construct
equilibria in which players perform the optimal symmetric amount of experimen-
tation whereafter, on the path of play, they once communicate and announce
whether they had a prior success. If so, both players keep experimenting forever;
otherwise, both stop experimenting. We punish early deviations (after the initial
period) through beliefs: if a player refrains from experimenting at a time when
the socially optimal symmetric strategy prole requires her to experiment, then
10One caveat here is that players may use the messages to create a controlled joint lottery
to coordinate continuation play in the equilibrium with observable payos. But then we can
encode the original message by using the odd digits only, while using the even digits to send
the messages constructed above.
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the other player reacts to this out-of-equilibrium event by assigning probability 1
to the good state of the world. Given the restriction on beliefs that we adopted in
Section 2, our equilibrium concept does not allow us to assign the same optimistic
beliefs to a player who observes a deviation at t = 0: as a player deviating in the
rst round cannot have seen a prior success, the other player cannot draw any
inference on the state of the world from this deviation, and thus is not allowed
to update her beliefs.11
Proposition 5. There exists a threshold py < pm such that for all initial beliefs
p  py, the experimentation game with private payos admits an equilibrium that
is path-equivalent to the socially optimal symmetric pure-strategy prole.
Proof. First, we specify the players' strategies, beginning with the behavior after
all message histories and then turning to action histories. Play following any
history in which at least one player did not experiment in period 0 is specied
separately below; following such a history, we will prescribe players to play an
equilibrium with truthful communication. For brevity, we do not explicitly specify
behavior following observable simultaneous deviations as this is irrelevant for the
incentives to deviate unilaterally.
If both players used the risky arm in all periods t   sc  1, they both report
truthfully in period  sc; following any other message history in which both players
used the risky arm in period 0, they send babbling messages. Both players use the
risky arm in any period t   sc   1 as long as both did so in all prior periods. If
both players used the risky arm in all periods t   sc  1 and player j announced
a success in period  sc, player i uses the risky arm in all periods t   sc. If
both players used the risky arm in all periods t   sc   1 and neither announced
a success in period  sc, player i uses the risky arm in period t0   sc if and
only if he had a prior success himself or player j used the risky arm in a period
t00 2 f sc; : : : ; t0   1g when neither player did so in periods t =  sc; : : : ; t00   1.
We are left to specify behavior for all action histories in which at least one player
used the safe arm in any period t   sc 1. If the rst unilateral deviation occurs
in a period t0 2 f1; : : : ;  sc   1g, and player j is the one who deviates, then in
all periods t  t0 + 1 player i uses the risky arm and player j plays the autarky
strategy (conditioning her behavior on her own signals only). Recall that the case
of a rst deviation in period t = 0 is handled separately below.
Second, we specify the players' beliefs if there was no deviation in period
t = 0. It is convenient to specify beliefs about whether the state of the world is
good (rather than the usual beliefs about nodes in an information set).12 Both
players use Bayesian updating on the path of play; in particular, if both players
11We could circumvent this constraint by letting the players observe one draw from the
distribution of risky payos before the game starts. The following proposition would then hold
with py = psc.
12A probability distribution about possible nodes in a player's information set (where a node
can be identied through whether and when the other player had a success when experiment-
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used the risky arm in all periods t   sc   1, both update under the assumption
that the opponent reports truthfully in period  sc. If the rst unilateral deviation
occurs in a period t0 2 f1; : : : ;  sc 1g, and player j is the one who deviates, then
player i switches irrevocably to the belief that the state of the world is good with
probability 1, while player j continues to apply Bayes' rule, conditioning on her
own observations only. If the rst unilateral deviation occurs in a period t   sc
by player j after a success was announced by player j, player i ignores this as well
as all possible future deviations of player j and continues to believe that the state
of the world is good with probability 1. If the rst unilateral deviation occurs in
a period t   sc by player j after a success was announced by player i but not
player j, player i ignores this deviation as well as all possible future deviations
of player j and continues to apply Bayes' rule in every period based on his own
experimentation results only. If the rst unilateral deviation occurs in a period
t   sc by player j after no success was announced, player i switches irrevocably
to the belief that the state of the world is good with probability 1 while player j
updates using only her own experimentation results from thereon.
Third, we prove sequential rationality if there was no deviation in period
t = 0. Any player who had a success in a period t   sc   1 is willing to
announce it truthfully in round  sc; given that the other player believes the
announcement to be truthful (i.e. has the belief that the state of the world is
good with probability 1), it is optimal for her to choose the risky action forever.
If the rst unilateral deviation occurs in a period t0 2 f1; : : : ;  sc  1g, and player
j is the one who deviates, then player i holds the belief that the state of the
world is good and hence it is optimal for him to choose the risky action in all
subsequent periods. As a consequence, player j ceases to learn anything from
observing i's future behavior, hence nds herself in an autarky situation. It is
optimal for her, therefore, to play the autarky strategy, and beliefs are consistent
with this. If player j does not deviate, she obtains the value of the symmetric
cooperative solution. Since the latter is always weakly larger than the autarky
value, the deviation is unprotable. We are left to consider behavior following
histories in which the rst deviation occurred in a period t   sc. If both players
used the risky arm in all periods t   sc 1, and if player i had a success or player
j announced a success, it is obviously optimal for player i to always choose the
risky action since he assigns probability 1 to the good state of the world. Exactly
the same holds if both players used the risky arm in all periods t   sc   1,
neither announced a success and player j was the rst to deviate by using the
risky instead of the safe arm. If both players used the risky arm in all periods
t   sc   1 and player j neither announced a success nor was the rst to deviate
ing in addition to one's own observations), can be constructed in the obvious way from the
probability that the state of the world is good together with how often the other player used
the risky arm; this probability distribution is unique but for the fact that we can arbitrarily
prescribe when another player had a success following an out-of-equilibrium observation.
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to the safe arm in a period t   sc, player i's belief is below psc if he had no prior
success himself, and hence it is optimal for him to use the safe arm.
Fourth, we construct a continuation equilibrium that deters deviations at
t = 0. Fix a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of the game with observable
payos starting with the common prior B(1; p). By Lemma 1, the corresponding
equilibrium value is bounded above by ~v(B(1; p)), the value from both players
always using the risky arm until their belief falls below the autarky cut-o pa.
Consider an equilibrium of the game with private payos that is path-equivalent
to the Markov perfect equilibrium; such an equilibrium exists by Proposition
4. Following a unilateral deviation by player j in t = 0, we require player i to
communicate truthfully whether he had a success; by the argument underlying
Proposition 4, this is incentive compatible. If he announces a failure, both players'
continuation play corresponds to the selected equilibrium of the game with private
payos.
So, if player j experiments at t = 0, her expected overall payo is
vsc(p) = (1  )Ep + 

p[1  (1  )2]E1 +
 
1  p[1  (1  )2] vsc(B(2; p))	| {z }
(I)
;
if she deviates, this payo is no more than
 fpE1 + (1  p) ~v(B(1; p))g| {z }
(II)
:
By construction, ~v(B(1; p))  vsc(B(1; p)). Being the upper envelope of linear
functions, vsc is convex. This implies that vsc(B(1; p))  B(1; p)E1 + (1  
B(1; p)) vsc(B(2; p)). As the points (B(1; p); vsc(B(1; p))), (B(2; p); vsc(B(2; p)))
and (1; E1) do not lie on a line, this inequality is in fact strict. Using this and
the fact that (1   p)B(1; p) = p(1   ), one has (I) > (II). As Ep  0 for
p  pm, moreover, we see by continuity that there exists a belief py < pm such
that deviating at t = 0 is suboptimal.
In our equilibrium construction, deviations in the initial period are punished
through a continuation equilibrium that is path-equivalent to a symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium. Of course, there may be harsher punishments for a player
who deviates in the rst period. For example, we could search for an equilibrium
of the game with observable payos that minimizes the payo of a given player.
By playing a continuation equilibrium that is path-equivalent to this asymmetric
equilibrium, we would punish initial deviations more severely and hence increase
the range of initial beliefs for which the symmetric social optimal strategy prole
can be sustained. In the above proposition as well as in Proposition 6 below, we
refrain from doing so for ease of exposition.
The belief following a deviation in an early (but not the initial) round may
seem somewhat unusual in the above equilibrium. Intuitively, upon observing
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such a deviation, player i reasons as follows: \Clearly, player j was not careful
and made a mistake. She must already know that the state of the world is good
to be so careless." While this reasoning is compatible with the logic of sequential
equilibrium, the equilibrium construction hinges crucially on this particular choice
of out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Our next aim is therefore to show that private
payos can lead to a more ecient outcome even under the stringent requirement
that whenever a player|who is still uncertain as to whether the state of the world
is good|observes a deviation to the safe action, her beliefs become as pessimistic
as possible.
Denition 1 (Pessimistic Beliefs). We say that an equilibrium of the game with
private payos has pessimistic beliefs if a player who observes a deviation to the
safe action and does not yet assign probability 1 to the good state of the world,
believes that the deviating player had only failures before the deviation.
Recall from Proposition 4 that for any equilibrium with observable payos,
we can construct an equilibrium with private payos that induces the same distri-
bution over experimentation paths. In this equilibrium, players truthfully com-
municate after every period in which they experimented until a rst success is
announced.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 4 has pessimistic beliefs.
Proof. If player i had a success, he believes that the state of the world is good with
probability 1. Similarly, once player j has announced a success, the equilibrium
is such that player i believes with probability 1 that there has been a success, and
assigns probability 1 to the good state of world from then on. Consider a history,
therefore, in which neither player j announced a success nor player i observed
a success himself. As player i believes that player j communicated truthfully in
the past, he believes that all of player j's experiments have been failures. So his
beliefs are indeed pessimistic.
Our next proposition shows that even if we restrict ourselves to pessimistic
beliefs, we can nd equilibria that implement the optimal symmetric strategy
prole for suciently optimistic starting beliefs. To see the intuition, recall that
in the symmetric optimum, the planner updates her beliefs on the basis of two
experiments in every period until the belief falls below psc. Absent meaningful
communication, however, each player updates her belief using only the result of
her own experimentation, and hence beliefs decrease at a slower rate. The key
observation is that for high enough starting beliefs, this slower learning implies
that the social planner reaches psc before players who do not communicate reach
pm. Above pm, players myopically prefer to experiment, and in the equilibrium
that we will construct, they do so up to the period in which a social planner
who has not observed a success would cease experimentation. At that point in
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time, players truthfully communicate and continue experimenting only if at least
one player had a prior success. A player who deviates by not experimenting
prior to this point in time reduces her myopic payo and induces a symmetric
continuation equilibrium in which payos are weakly lower than in the optimal
symmetric strategy prole; thus, such a deviation is unprotable.
Let nz = minfn 2 N : B(n; pm) < pscg. This is the minimal number of failed
experiments that moves a player's belief from pm to below psc. Next, dene pz
implicitly by pm = B(nz; pz), so that B(2nz; pz) < psc  B(2nz 1; pz). Intuitively,
consider the case where both players always experiment and all experiments fail.
Then, for initial beliefs p  pz, a social planner who observes both players' failures
reaches psc before a player who only observes her own failures reaches pm.
Proposition 6. For all initial beliefs p  pz, the experimentation game with
private payos has an equilibrium with pessimistic beliefs that is path-equivalent
to the socially optimal symmetric pure-strategy prole.
Proof. Recall that there exists a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in the
case of observable payos. Choose such a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium
for any starting belief p. By Proposition 4 there exists an equilibrium with private
payos that is path-equivalent. Denote this equilibrium by (p).
We are now ready to specify strategies.13 In all periods t  nz 1, both players
babble and use the risky arm provided no player chose the safe arm in a previous
period t0  t   1. If a single player deviated and chose the safe arm in a period
  nz 1, the players truthfully communicate at the beginning of period +1. If
player i communicated truthfully in period +1, he plays the strategy prescribed
by (q) in periods t   + 1, where q = B(2   1; p) if no player announced a
success, and q = 1 otherwise. If player i did not communicate truthfully in period
 + 1, he either had a success he did not announce or he incorrectly announced
a success he did not have. In the former case, he uses the risky arm in periods
t   + 1; in the latter case, he plays the autarky strategy.
We are left to specify strategies in case both players used the risky arm in
all periods t  nz   1. In this case, both players truthfully announce at the
beginning of period nz whether they had a success in any of the previous rounds;
and independent of how the play proceeds from period nz onwards, players babble
in every period t > nz. If player j announced a success, or if player i observed
a success himself in any prior period, player i uses the risky arm in all periods
t  nz. If neither announced a success in period nz, player i uses the risky arm in
period t0   sc if and only if he had a prior success himself or player j used the
risky arm in a period t00 2 fnz; : : : ; t0   1g when neither player did so in periods
t = nz; : : : ; t00   1.
Next, we specify beliefs about the state of the world. Any player who had a
prior success believes the state of the world to be good with probability 1. In any
13We follow the usual convention again and ignore simultaneous deviations.
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period t  nz   1 such that both players used the risky arm in all periods t0  t,
the belief of player i is pi(t) = B(t  1; p) if all his experiments failed. If a player
deviated to the safe arm in a period   nz   1, she believes the state of the
world is good with probability 1 if the other player announces a success in period
 +1 (or she had a prior success herself); otherwise her belief is q = B(2   1; p).
Thereafter, beliefs are as in the equilibrium (q).
Now suppose that both players used the risky arm in all periods t  nz   1.
Each player believes the other's message in period nz to be truthful, and all
subsequent messages to be uninformative. If player i deviates in period nz by
incorrectly announcing a success he did not have, and player j does not announce
a success in period nz, then player i's belief in period   nz equals 1 if he
experiences a success in one of the rounds t = nz; : : : ;    1, and equals B(2nz +
n; p) if he carries out n experiments in periods t = nz; : : : ;    1 and they all fail.
If player j is the rst to deviate in period t0  nz after neither player announced
a success, player i believes the state of the world to be good with probability 1.
If player i is the rst to deviate in period t0  nz after neither player announced
a success, player i's belief in round   t0+1 equals 1 if he experiences a success
in one of the rounds t = t0; : : : ;    1, and equals B(2nz + n; p) if he carries out
n experiments in periods t = t0; : : : ;    1 and they all fail.
As the beliefs that we have specied follow Bayes' rule whenever possible, it
remains to show sequential rationality. Each player uses the risky arm whenever
he assigns probability 1 to the good state of the world, which is clearly optimal.
If a single player deviates to the safe arm in a period   nz  1, it is optimal for
both players to communicate truthfully at the beginning of period  + 1 by the
argument underlying Proposition 4. If player i does communicate truthfully in
period  + 1, he believes with probability 1 that player j plays according to (q)
with q specied above. As (q) constitutes an equilibrium, it is optimal for player
i to play according to (q) as well. If player i announces a success in period  +1
that he did not have, player j uses the risky arm forever, so player i nds himself
in an autarky situation and optimally plays the autarky strategy. If player i does
not announce a success he had, it is clearly optimal for him to use the risky arm
forever. If player i is the rst to deviate in a period   nz   1, his belief about
the state of the world is weakly above pm; by the same argument as the one used
in the proof of Proposition 5 for deviations in period t = 0, such a deviation is
unprotable.
We are left to rule out deviations by player i in a period t0  nz following
a history in which both players used the risky arm in all periods t  nz   1,
player i had no success himself, neither player announced a success, and player
j was not the rst to deviate in a period t00 2 fnz; : : : ; t0   1g. In this case,
player i's belief is below psc. If player i was the rst to deviate in a period
t00 2 fnz; : : : ; t0 1g, player j uses the risky arm in all future periods independent
of her experimentation results. The same holds if there was no deviation in any
19
round t  t0   1 and player i deviates to the risky arm in round t0. If there was
no prior deviation and player i uses the safe arm in round t0, nally, he expects
player j to use the safe arm in all future periods. Whatever he does in round t0,
therefore, player i cannot learn anything from player j's future behavior and so
nds himself in an autarky situation. As psc < pa, it is thus optimal for player i
to use the safe arm.
Some straightforward computations show that
pz  (1  )[1   + (2  )]jE0j
(1  )[1   + (2  )]jE0j+ (1  )E1 > p
m
and
pz <
[1   + (2  )]jE0j
[1   + (2  )]jE0j+ (1  )E1 :
Since we could again use harsher punishments after early deviations, the interval
[pz; 1] constitutes just part of the set of initial beliefs for which the outcome
of the socially optimal symmetric pure-strategy prole can be sustained in an
equilibrium with pessimistic beliefs.
For a range of initial beliefs below pz, the same logic as in Proposition 6 allows
us to construct equilibria in which the players may not reach the symmetric social
optimum but perform more experiments, and are better o, than in any equilib-
rium with observable payos.14 Suppose that B(2; pa) > psc, so that by Corollary
1 the ecient amount of experimentation cannot be reached with observable pay-
os. Let n0 = minfn 2 N : B(n; pm) < pag. This is the minimal number of failed
experiments that moves a player's belief from pm to below pa. Next, dene p0 < pz
implicitly by pm = B(n0+2; p0), so that B(2n0+4; p0) = B(n0+2; pm) < B(2; pa).
Then, starting from a prior p  p0 and dening strategies as in Proposition 6 but
with nz replaced by n0, we obtain an equilibrium of the game with private payos
in which both players experiment some way below pa. In view of the similarity
with the above construction, we omit the details.
5 A Continuous-Time Limit
We now embed our discrete-time model in a continuous-time framework that
coincides (up to a normalization of the safe payo to zero) with the two-player
version of the setup studied by Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005).
Let time be continuous and suppose that operating the risky arm comes at
a ow cost of s > 0 per unit of time. In the good state ( = 1), the risky arm
yields lump-sum payos which arrive at the jump times of a Poisson process with
14We established in the social planner's problem that the players' average payo when both
experiment for  periods is single-peaked in  . Here, we are below  sc, so the average payo is
still increasing in the number of experiments.
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intensity  > 0. These lump-sums are independent draws from a time-invariant
distribution with known mean h > 0, and the Poisson processes in question are
independent across the two players. In the bad state ( = 0), the risky arm never
generates a lump-sum payo. The safe arm does not produce any such payos
either, but is free to use.
Given the common discount rate r > 0, a player's payo increment from using
a bad risky arm for a length of time  > 0 isZ 
0
r e r t ( s) dt =  1  e r ( s):
The expected discounted payo increment from a good risky arm is
E
Z 
0
r e r t (h dNt   s dt)

=
Z 
0
r e r t (h  s) dt =  1  e r (h  s);
here Nt is a standard Poisson process with intensity , and the rst equality
follows from the fact that Nt   t is a martingale. We assume h > s so that
a good risky arm dominates the safe arm. Finally, the probability of observing
at least one lump-sum on a good risky arm during a time interval of length  is
1  e .
If we let the players adjust their actions only at the times t = 0;; 2; : : : for
some xed  > 0, we are back in our discrete-time framework with  = 1 e ,
E0 =  s, E1 = h   s, and  = e r. Letting  ! 0, we can thus study the
impact of vanishing time lags on the results we derived above.
First, we note that psc and pc converge in a monotonically decreasing fashion
to one and the same limit as  vanishes; this limit is the ecient two-player
cut-o from Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005),
p2 =
rjE0j
r(E1 + jE0j) + 2E1 :
Thus, the dierence between the socially optimal symmetric strategy prole and
its unrestricted counterpart (which is small to start with by Proposition 2) com-
pletely disappears in the limit, and implementing the symmetric optimum as we
do in Propositions 5 and 6 fully solves the free-rider problem.
Second, we observe that the restriction to suciently optimistic priors in
Proposition 5 can be dropped when  becomes small.
Corollary 2. For any initial belief p > p2, there exists a (p) > 0 such that for all
 < (p), the experimentation game with private payos admits an equilibrium
that is path-equivalent to the socially optimal symmetric pure-strategy prole.
Proof. The monotone convergence psc ! p2 as  ! 0 implies that p2 < psc < p
for suciently small . Restricting ourselves to such , we specify strategies and
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beliefs exactly as in the proof of Proposition 5. According to that proof, these
strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium if
vsc(p)   fpE1 + (1  p) ~v(B(1; p))g :
As ~v is a non-decreasing function and B(1; p) < p, the inequality
vsc(p)   fpE1 + (1  p) ~v(p)g
is a sucient condition. And as  ! 1 and  ! 0 when  ! 0, it is enough to
show that
lim
!0
vsc(p)  lim
!0
~v(p) :
Starting from the explicit representation for the constrained planner's value
function in Section 3, it is straightforward to compute
lim
!0
vsc(p) = Ep  
Ep2
w(p2)
w(p)
with
w(p) = (1  p)

1  p
p
 r
2
;
this limit is the value of the planner's problem in continuous time. Similarly,
lim
!0
~v(p) = max

0; Ep  
Ep1
w(p1)
w(p)

with
p1 =
rjE0j
r(E1 + jE0j) + E1 ;
the autarky cut-o in continuous time. As p2 < p

1 < p
m, we have Ep2 < Ep1 < 0.
A simple computation reveals that
Ep2
w(p2)
<
Ep1
w(p1)
;
so the two limits satisfy the desired inequality.
There is no counterpart to this result for the equilibria constructed in Propo-
sition 6. As  vanishes, pz converges to a belief strictly above pm, so having ever
shorter reaction lags does not help here. In fact, what these equilibria require is
that it take a suciently long string of failures for the belief of a player learning
only from his own experiments to pass pm; more precisely, the minimal length
of time this must take is nz. When  decreases, each failure becomes less in-
formative, and ny increases so as to make nz converge to the length of time a
player would have to experiment unsuccessfully in continuous time for his belief
to fall from lim!0 pz to pm.
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6 More Than Two Players
We focused on the two-player case but our main insights carry over to more
players with only minor modications.
With observable payos, our proof that in any equilibrium, no player is willing
to experiment at a belief below the single-agent cut-o, and that some player must
experiment above it, goes through almost unaltered. Hence, with observable
payos and N players, the equilibrium amount of experimentation is generically
at least K (the single-agent optimum) and never more than K+N 1. Whenever
the social optimum requires a higher amount, therefore, it cannot be achieved in
equilibrium.
With private payos, the observation that truthful communication is easy to
sustain remains intact, and so does Proposition 4. Any equilibrium of the game
with observable payos thus has a path-equivalent counterpart in the game with
private payos.
The logic of the equilibrium constructions in Propositions 5 and 6 also contin-
ues to apply, though some adjustments are needed in the details of the argument.
Regarding possible deviations in early rounds, our proofs of these propositions
use the fact, established in Lemma 1, that for two players a symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium yields a lower payo than if both players use the autarky
cut-o, which in turn yields a lower payo than the socially optimal symmetric
pure-strategy prole. As our proof of Lemma 1 does not extend to more than
two players, we cannot be sure that the threat to play a path-equivalent coun-
terpart of a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is enough to deter rst-round
deviations.15
There are at least two ways to solve this problem. The rst is to establish ex-
istence of some (possibly non-Markov and asymmetric) continuation equilibrium
that gives a lower payo to the deviating player than the symmetric optimum.
The second is to consider the problem of a social planner who is restricted to
symmetric (but possibly mixed) strategies prescribing use of the safe arm below
the autarky cut-o, and to establish sucient conditions under which this plan-
ner requires all players to use the risky arm with probability 1 at or above the
autarky cut-o, so that all players applying this cut-o dominates any symmetric
(and in particular, symmetric Markov perfect) equilibrium. One such condition
is that the probability  of observing the high payo on a good risky arm be
15Our proof of Lemma 1 does not generalize to N > 2 because it relies on the observation
that two players using the autarky cut-o attribute a positive value to a free experiment, that
is, to the observation of a draw from the distribution of risky payos before the game starts.
This is no longer true for more than two players. The reason is that the observation of a bad
signal XL can \crowd out" one round of joint experimentation. When N = 2, this happens
precisely when the one experiment thus lost overall would not have been worthwhile performing
in the rst place. When N > 2, however, a bad signal can lead to a loss of more than one signal
overall, and this is detrimental to the players.
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suciently low. In fact, when  is low enough, the set of beliefs at which a
completely unrestricted social planner wants all players to use the risky arm is
strictly larger than [pa; 1], and so a planner restricted in the above fashion can do
no better than prescribe use of the risky arm with probability 1 on this interval.
Assuming a low  is natural given our emphasis on implementing the socially
optimal symmetric strategy prole. This is because the more players there are,
the larger is the potential performance loss of this strategy prole relative to the
truly ecient prole that an unrestricted social planner would like to implement.
In the continuous-time limit  ! 0 of the previous section, however, the dier-
ence between the socially optimal symmetric strategy prole and its unrestricted
counterpart vanishes. With more than two players, assuming a small period
length  thus justies our focus on the symmetric prole and at the same time
ensures robustness to early deviations of the equilibria in Propositions 5 and 6.
In particular, Corollary 2 holds with p2 replaced by
pN =
rjE0j
r(E1 + jE0j) +NE1 ;
the ecient N -player cut-o from Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005).
Finally, the equilibrium construction used in Proposition 6 becomes more
powerful as the number of players increases. Calculating the optimal stopping
time for the symmetric social planner's solution as in Section 3, one nds that
this stopping time is weakly decreasing in the number of players. Because the
time it takes a single player to reach the myopic belief is independent of N by
denition, the set of beliefs for which the optimal symmetric strategy prole can
be implemented as in Proposition 6 increases in the number of players.
7 Conclusion
We analyzed a discrete-time experimentation game with two-armed bandits. For
publicly observable payos, the free-rider problem is so severe that in any equilib-
rium, both players together perform at most one experiment more than a single
agent would. Privately observed payos mitigate the free-rider problem to the
point where for suciently optimistic prior beliefs, it becomes possible to sus-
tain the socially optimal symmetric pure-strategy prole as an equilibrium with
cheap-talk communication. We showed that these results are robust to letting
players react very fast, and discussed how they extend to more than two players.
Throughout, we assumed that players cannot prove the results of their own
experiments. If we suppose instead that a player can provide hard evidence of
any prior success, our equilibrium constructions in Propositions 5 and 6 still
carry through. Intuitively, whenever players communicate, they do so truthfully
in these equilibria and, hence, it is unnecessary to show a proof. Moreover, a
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player who has had a success is indierent as to the other player's behavior and
therefore willing not to reveal hard information.
In our model, only the good state of the world can be revealed. Suppose
instead that the bad state of the world can also be fully revealed through an
additional payoXB. In a research project, for example, this could be a surprising
impossibility result. Whenever XB is not drawn in the bad state, the payo XL
is drawn, which can also materialize in the good state. As long as the high payo
XH is drawn more often in the good state than XB is drawn in the bad state,
players become more pessimistic whenever they observe XL. In this case, the
social planner's solution can be characterized as in Section 3, and Propositions 4
and 6 can be adapted. Regarding the former, observe that a player who drew XB
has a continuation payo of zero irrespectively of what the other player has done
or said; such a player is clearly willing to communicate his information truthfully.
As a player who has observed a bad signal must cease to experiment, the
equilibrium underlying Proposition 6 needs to be adjusted. On the path of play,
rather than waiting to communicate until a player reaches the myopic cut-o
based on his own experimentation results, we let players truthfully announce in
the early periods whether they have received a bad signal or not. Whenever a
bad signal is observed and announced, both players cease to experiment. When
observing the opponent deviate to the safe arm in an early period (other than
the rst), a player concludes that the opponent has received a bad signal and,
hence, stops experimenting. Otherwise, the logic of the equilibrium construction
remains the same: initially, players are myopically motivated to experiment, and
they truthfully communicate whether or not they had a success only at the point
in time at which a social planner observing all experimentation results would
reach the cut-o for the optimal symmetric strategy prole.
Although we believe that in most strategic experimentation problems the
presumption that players can communicate is realistic, one may wonder exactly
what role communication plays for our results. The answer is somewhat subtle.
In the equilibria of Propositions 5 and 6, players only communicate at a single
point in time on the path of play. That is, after a given number of rounds of
experimentation|say 100|players announce truthfully whether or not they had
a success. Intuitively, one could replace this communication by one round of
play in period 101 in which each player uses the risky arm if and only if she
had a prior success, ensuring that all necessary information is exchanged within
one round. The role of communication may thus seem very limited. Truthful
communication, however, plays another important role: it ensures the existence
of a simple continuation equilibrium following a deviation|including one in the
rst period. What kind of equilibria exist absent communication remains, in our
view, an interesting question for further research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
As pc  psc it follows that below pc the social planner prefers not experimenting
over one or two experiments. We calculate the payo of performing one experi-
ment and then stopping as
(1  )1
2
Ep + pE1;
and the payo of performing two experiments and then stopping as
(1  )Ep + p[1  (1  )2]E1 :
Subtracting the latter payo from the former, we get
 (1  )1
2
Ep + p(1  )E1;
which is negative above ~pc and positive below. Because it is suboptimal to perform
more than two experiments below ~pc, it follows that between pc and ~pc, the planner
prefers one experiment to two experiments.
Next, we establish that above ~pc, the planner prefers the sequence 2{1 (two
experiments this round followed by one experiment next round) to the sequence
1{2. Suppose it is optimal for the social planner to let one player experiment
in one round, and two players in the subsequent round. We will prove that the
planner can make herself strictly better o by rst letting two players experiment,
then one player, and afterwards using the same strategy as before. In the two
rounds under consideration, the expected payo of the social planner from 2{1 is
(1  )Ep +   12Ep + p[1  (1  )2]12E1	 :
The expected payo from 1{2 is
(1  )(1
2
Ep + Ep) :
Subtracting the latter payo from the former, we get
(1  )1
2
 
Ep + p[1  (1  )2]E1
  Ep	 :
The part in parentheses is positive above psc by denition, and  Ep is positive
above psc because psc  pm, so the sequence 1{2 will never be used by the social
planner above psc.
This means that if the planner ever switched to 1 (i.e. a single experiment)
above ~pc, she would have to continue with 1 until pc is reached. In a last step,
we rule this out by showing that the planner engages in at most one round of
experimentation by a single agent before stopping.
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If the planner nds it optimal at some belief p to engage in two rounds of
experimentation by a single agent and then stop, her expected discounted payo
is
(1  )1
2
Ep + pE1
+(1  p)

(1  )1
2

p(1  )
1  p E1 +
1  p
1  pE0

+ 
p(1  )
1  p E1

;
which must be non-negative. The expression in braces must be non-negative
as well or else it would not be optimal to perform one nal experiment after a
failure. The expected discounted payo from performing two experiments at once
and then stopping is
(1  )Ep + p[1  (1  )2]E1:
Subtracting the former payo from the latter, we obtain
(1  )1
2
[p(1  )E1 + (1  p)E0] + (1  )12pE1 + p(1  )E1
  (1  )1
2
[p(1  )E1 + (1  p)E0] + p(1  )E1
	
= (1  )(1  )1
2
[p(1  )E1 + (1  p)E0] + p(1  )E1
	
+ (1  )1
2
pE1;
which is positive since the term in braces is non-negative and E1 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Given p(0) = p, let ~v(p) be the players' common value under the strategy prole
where both experiment with probability 1 if and only if p(t)  pa, and vM(p) the
value in some symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium.
We rst show that under the former strategy prole, the players assign positive
value to a free signal, that is, for all beliefs p 2 ]0; 1[ ,
~v(p) < pE1 + (1  p)~v(B(1; p)) :
As a rst step, note that
~v(p) = (1  T )Ep + T [1  (1  )2T ]pE1 ;
where T = T (p) is the number of periods needed for the belief to fall below the
autarky cut-o pa when the players' experiments all fail; that is, B(2T; p) < pa 
B(2T  2; p). Now, if B(2T  1; p)  pa, the free signal does not alter the number
of experiments that the players conduct under the strategy prole in question,
and their expected payo is
(1  T )Ep + T [1  (1  )2T+1]pE1 > ~v(p):
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If B(2T   1; p) < pa, by contrast, the players engage in one less round of joint
experimentation when all experiments fail, and their expected payo is
(1  T 1)Ep + T 1[1  (1  )2T 1]pE1
= ~v(p)  T 1
n
(1  )Ep + [1  (1  )2T ]pE1   [1  (1  )2T 1]pE1
o
:
Because the inequality B(2T   1; p) < pa means that an agent starting with the
initial belief p in autarky strictly prefers not to experiment after 2T   1 failed
experiments, the expression in braces is negative. In either case, therefore, the
players benet from the free signal, which establishes the claimed inequality.
Let pn = B(p; n) be the belief that is reached after n failed experiments. We
are now ready to show by backward induction that vM(pn)  ~v(pn) for all n 2 N0.
First observe that vM(p) = ~v(p) = 0 for all p < pa. For the induction step, let
pn  pa and assume that vM(pn0)  ~v(pn0) for all n0 > n. Let q be the probability
with which the players experiment in the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium
at the belief pn. As each player must weakly prefer to experiment at pn, we have
vM(pn) = (1  )Epn + [q(1  (1  )2) + (1  q)]pnE1
+(1  q)(1  pn)vM(pn+1) + q[(1  )2pn + 1  pn]vM(pn+2)
 (1  )Epn + [q(1  (1  )2) + (1  q)]pnE1
+(1  q)(1  pn)~v(pn+1) + q[(1  )2pn + 1  pn]~v(pn+2) :
The right-hand side is linear in q and equals ~v(pn) for q = 1. It thus suces to
show that the right-hand side is increasing in q, which is equivalent to
[1  (1  )2   ]pnE1   (1  pn)~v(pn+1) + [(1  )2pn + 1  pn]~v(pn+2) > 0:
As ~v(pn+1) < pn+1E1 + (1  pn+1)~v(pn+2), moreover, it is enough to show that
[1  (1  )2   ]pnE1   (1  pn)pn+1E1
+ [(1  )2pn + 1  pn   (1  pn)(1  pn+1)]~v(pn+2)  0:
As (1  pn)pn+1 = pn(1  ), this is is easily seen to hold as an equality.
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